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CHAPTER 7
Work Incentives and Disincentives
Paul T. Decker 
Mathematica Policy Research
The unemployment insurance (UI) system must address a funda 
mental trade-off between two important factors: (1) the need to provide 
unemployed workers with benefits that are "adequate," as discussed in 
Chapter 5, and (2) the need to minimize the disincentive to rapid reem- 
ployment implicit in the provision of UI benefits. The intent to provide 
adequate benefits tends to encourage more generous ones, which 
would ensure that the economic needs of a larger proportion of claim 
ants are met. However, more generous benefits tend to strengthen the 
reernployment disincentive. Given this trade-off, states have been 
urged to provide benefits high enough to replace a substantial portion 
of lost wages, but not so high as to significantly dilute the incentive to 
return to work. As a result, a "rule-of-thumb" that has guided UI policy 
since the inception of the system is that weekly UI benefits should 
replace roughly 50 percent of workers' weekly wages.
This chapter reviews the theory and empirical evidence on the 
effects of UI policy on the behavior of unemployed workers in order to 
investigate the following issues:
• Whether and the extent to which more generous benefits act as a 
disincentive to reernployment, thus prolonging unemployment and 
increasing the unemployment rate
• Whether prolonged unemployment can have a positive impact by 
leading to higher-paying work if claimants use the period of unem 
ployment to select the best possible job
• Whether the negative effects of UI on reernployment are offset by 
effects of UI on labor market transitions other than the unemploy-
285
286 Work Incentives and Disincentives
ment-to-employment transition or by spillover effects of claim 
ants' behavior on unemployed workers who do not receive UI 
benefits
The discussion then turns to policy options that have evolved in 
response to the reemployment disincentive that is inherent in UI and 
concludes with a consideration of the task faced by policy makers in 
light of the theoretical and empirical evidence on the effect of UI on 
employment.
Direct Effects of Unemployment Insurance 
on Claimants: Disincentives to Reemployment
Theoretical studies have demonstrated that more generous benefits 
create an incentive for claimants to remain unemployed, and empirical 
studies have shown that UI does indeed tend to lengthen unemploy 
ment spells of claimants. Increases in either the amount of benefits or 
in the potential duration of benefits induce longer spells, but the magni 
tude of these effects is still uncertain. In this section, both the theory 
and empirical findings related to this effect are reviewed.
Theory
The theory supporting the disincentive effect of UI is based on the 
premise that UI tends to prolong unemployment spells because it low 
ers the cost of unemployment. Unemployed workers who receive UI 
benefits tend to consume more leisure, to reduce the intensity (and 
therefore the cost) of their job search, or to be more selective in accept 
ing a job offer than they would be in the absence of UI. All of these 
tendencies will generate longer unemployment spells. Increasing the 
two key parameters of the UI system—the amount and potential dura 
tion of benefits—would tend to exacerbate this effect.
Two general theoretical models, the labor-supply model and the job- 
search model, have been used to describe the disincentive to reemploy 
ment inherent in UI. Moffitt and Nicholson (1982) utilized a labor-sup 
ply model to represent the effect of UI on the duration of 
unemployment spells. In this model, a newly unemployed individual is
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assumed to plan his or her activities over a fixed period, deciding how 
to divide his or her time between work and leisure in the form of unem 
ployment. During the period, the individual may either consume the 
maximum amount of leisure by remaining unemployed for the full 
interval or accept a job that is to begin at a particular point, remaining 
unemployed until that point.
In the labor-supply model that includes UI, the budget constraint rel 
evant to individuals who are eligible for UI and are planning employ 
ment-related activities over period T is represented by line ABC in 
figure 7.1. For an unemployment spell that exceeds the point at which 
UI benefits are exhausted, which is typically 26 weeks after the initial 
claim, the cost of an additional week of unemployment is the foregone 
earnings for that week. The individual worker is assumed to receive a 
fixed weekly wage, w, when employed, and this fixed wage represents 
the earnings foregone for a week of unemployment. For an unemploy 
ment spell that is less than 26 weeks, the net cost of an additional week 
of unemployment is w-b, where b is the weekly UI benefit received by 
the claimant. The relatively lower cost of unemployment during peri 
ods of benefit receipt represents the unemployment subsidy of UI.
The labor-supply model can be used to show that making UI bene 
fits more generous (by increasing either the amount or potential dura 
tion of benefits) will increase unemployment spells of claimants. An 
increase in the weekly benefit amount tends to lengthen unemployment 
spells because it lowers the net cost of unemployment. The effect of the 
weekly benefit increase is represented in figure 7.1 by the shift of the 
budget constraint out to line AB'C'. For claimants who would exhaust 
benefits if the weekly benefit were not increased—that is, those 
between B and C on the original line—the increase in the benefit 
amount causes a pure income effect that raises consumption of leisure/ 
unemployment, as long as leisure is a normal good. For claimants who 
would not exhaust benefits if the weekly benefit were not raised— 
those located between A and B on the original line—the benefit expan 
sion generates both substitution and income effects in the same direc 
tion, thus increasing unemployment.
As is true for an increase in the amount of benefits, an increase in 
potential duration of benefits tends to lengthen unemployment spells, 
by extending the period in which the cost of unemployment is lowered 
by the availability of benefits. If, for example, the potential duration of
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benefits were increased from 26 to 39 weeks, the budget constraint in 
figure 7.1 would shift to line AB"C". The only claimants who would be 
affected by the shift are those who would have exhausted benefits in 
the absence of the shift. For these claimants, the income and substitu 
tion effects of the shift are also in the same direction—toward greater 
unemployment—so the impact of a longer potential benefit period is to 
unambiguously increase unemployment.
Figure 7.1 Impact of Increases in UI Benefit Parameters on the Budget 
Constraint for UI Claimants
Income
A *
26 39 J 
Weeks of Unemployment
The labor-supply model further implies that many claimants will 
return to work near the time that they exhaust their benefits. Reemploy- 
ment is likely to occur at this point because of the sudden increase in 
the cost to claimants of an additional week of unemployment when
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benefits are exhausted. This is represented by the kink in line ABC in 
figure 7.1. Many claimants will respond to this increase in the cost of 
unemployment by accepting a job or at least by searching more 
actively.'
An alternative approach to modeling the effect of UI on unemploy 
ment spells is based on the job-search model (Burdett 1979 and 
Mortensen 1977). In this model, it is assumed that the search occurs in 
an environment in which claimants are uncertain about the wage offers 
they will receive from one week to the next. Given such uncertainty, 
unemployed workers set their search intensity and their minimum 
acceptable wage so as to maximize the present value of lifetime 
income. It follows that claimants will end their unemployment spell 
when they receive a wage offer that exceeds their minimum acceptable 
wage.
In the job-search model, UI lowers the cost of unemployment and 
therefore encourages claimants to reduce the intensity of their search 
or to raise their minimum acceptable wage. Either response tends to 
prolong unemployment spells. In addition, an increase in the amount or 
potential duration of benefits will strengthen the reemployment disin 
centive. The resulting impact on rates of reemployment is illustrated in 
figure 7.2, which presents the time pattern of reemployment for UI 
claimants. The top panel shows that an increase in the benefit level 
tends to lower reemployment rates early in unemployment spells and to 
increase reemployment rates near and beyond the point of benefit 
exhaustion, P. The bottom panel shows that an increase in potential 
duration of benefits from PQ to P\ also decreases reemployment rates 
early in the unemployment spell and increases subsequent reemploy 
ment rates. The overall impact of these changes in reemployment rates 
would be to raise average unemployment spells.
Although both the labor-supply theory and the job-search theory 
imply that UI is likely to prolong unemployment spells, the job-search 
theory also suggests that prolonged unemployment spells can have a 
positive impact. Because UI provides financial assistance to claimants, 
they can presumably be more selective in taking a new job than they 
would be in the absence of UI. That is, because of UI, claimants can 
spend more time searching for the best possible job opening. If, as a 
result, claimants obtain more stable or higher-paying jobs than they 
would in the absence of UI, the prolonged unemployment spell has
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Increase in Benefit Amount
weekly benefit = b
weekly benefit = b
P (potential benefit duration) 
Weeks of Unemployment
Increase in Potential Benefit Duration
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been productive. Hence, if the job-search model is valid, and UI consti 
tutes a subsidy to job search rather than to leisure, a full evaluation of 
UI must weigh the benefits of increased search against the costs of 
increased unemployment.
The reemployment disincentives inherent in UI are intended to be 
offset somewhat by partial benefit schedules that allow claimants to 
accept part-time work and to still retain a portion of their UI benefits. 
However, partial benefit schedules, which vary by state, have been crit 
icized because they do not create clear incentives for partial benefit 
claimants to work as much as possible. The effect of the typical partial 
benefits schedule on the relationship between a worker's earnings and 
income (earnings plus benefits) is shown in figure 7.3. Claimants with 
zero earnings have income equal to their full weekly benefit amount 
(WBA). A small amount of earnings, up to one-quarter of WBA in fig 
ure 7.3, is disregarded in computing the partial benefit amount, so a 
one-dollar increase in earnings generates a one-dollar increase in 
income over this range. For earnings above the disregard, the benefit 
payment is reduced by a dollar for each additional dollar of earnings; 
the earnings-income function in figure 7.3 is flat over this section, as 
earnings simply displace benefits. Benefits are eliminated altogether if 
earnings exceed WBA. The effect of this elimination of benefits, com 
bined with the earnings disregard, is to create a point where a marginal 
increase in earnings causes a decline in income. This is reflected in the 
discontinuity in the earnings-income function at the point where earn 
ings equal WBA in figure 7.3.
Two aspects of the partial benefit schedule can be criticized for 
impeding work incentives. First, workers on the flat section of the earn 
ings-income function have no incentive to increase earnings at the mar 
gin, since the gain in earnings has no effect on income. Second, the 
discontinuity where earnings equal WBA creates a disincentive to raise 
earnings at the margin, since that increment will generate a decrease in 
income. Munts (1970) presents data from Wisconsin on benefit receipt 
that suggest that claimants are responsive to the work disincentives cre 
ated by partial benefits schedules.
The simplest way to maintain work incentives is to construct a par 
tial benefits schedule without an earnings disregard that reduces bene 
fits by a fraction of one dollar for every one-dollar increase in earnings. 
A benefits schedule of this type will create a relatively smooth,
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up ward-sloping earnings-income function, ensuring that as earnings 
increase income will also increase and benefits will be phased out 
gradually. This type of benefits schedule is used in Kentucky, where 
claimants lose 80 cents in benefits for every additional dollar of earn 
ings.







0.25 x WBA WBA 
Earnings
WBA = Full weekly benefit amount
Empirical Evidence
Over the past twenty years, many researchers have studied empiri 
cally the impact of UI benefits on unemployment spells. Danziger, 
Haveman, and Plotnick (1981), Gustman (1982), Burtless (1990), and 
Atkinson and Micklewright (1991) summarize the literature before the
Table 7.1 Estimated Impacts of UI Benefit Parameters
Study




UI records on Georgia Tobit 
claimants (1974- 1976)
Impact of weekly 
benefit amount
Impact of potential 
benefit duration
A one-week increase in potential 
duration increases unemployment 
spells by 0.4 - 0.5 weeks
Moffitt and Nicholson 
(1982)
Survey of FSB Maximum likelihood 
claimants (1974-1976) with kinked budget 
constraint
A 10 percentage-point increase in 
the replacement rate increases 
unemployment spells by 0.98 
weeks for men and 0.84 weeks for
A one-week increase in potential 
duration increases unemployment 





records, men only 
(1978-1983)
CWBH (1978-1983), 
JSARP survey data 
(1979-1981),UI 






A 10 percent increase in the 
benefit amount increases 
unemployment spells by half a 
week
A one-week increase in potential 
duration increases unemployment 
spells by 0 15 weeks
A one-week increase in potential 
duration increases unemployment 
spells by 0.17 to 0.45 weeks for 




model, based on 
taxation of benefits 
imposed in 1979
A 10 percentage-point increase in 
the replacement rate increases 
unemployment spells by between 
half a week and a full week
A one-week increase in potential 
duration increases unemployment 











CWBH, men only 
(1978-1983)
CWBH, men only 
(1978-1983)




OLS, based on 







Simulations based on 
estimated impacts of 
bonus experiments
Impact of weekly 
benefit amount
A 9 percent increase in benefits 
increases weeks of UI benefits by 
one-and-a-half weeks
A 10 percentage-point increase m 
the replacement rate increases 
unemployment spells by one-and- 
a-half weeks
A 10 percentage-point increase in 
the replacement rate increases 
unemployment spells by 0.3 to 
1.1 weeks
Impact of potential 
benefit duration
-
A one-week increase in potential 
duration increases unemployment 
spells by between 0 16 and 0.20 
weeks
A one-week increase in potential 
duration increases unemployment 
spells by 0.05 to 0.20 weeks
NOTE: FSB = Federal Supplemental Benefits CWBH = Continuous Wage and Benefit History These data were extracted from UI administrative records 
in thirteen states. JS ARP = Job Search Assistance Research Project (also known as the Employment Opportunity Pilot Project). The project was conducted 
in twenty sites. FSC = Federal Supplemental Compensation
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1980s. Therefore, the following discussion focuses primarily on esti 
mates that have appeared in the literature over the past ten to fifteen 
years, as summarized in table 7.1. The estimated impacts of the two 
main UI parameters on unemployment spells will be considered, as 
well as recent findings related to the timing of reemployment as associ 
ated with the point of benefit exhaustion, and the research on the poten 
tial impact of UI on reemployment wages.
Impact of Changes in the Benefit Amount
Studies of the effect of changes in the weekly benefit amount have 
consistently demonstrated that there is a disincentive to reemployment 
associated with UI. Almost uniformly, the research has generated esti 
mates showing that higher weekly benefit amounts lengthen the dura 
tion of unemployment spells. The magnitude of this effect, however, is 
uncertain. Based on the studies completed as of 1977, Hamermesh 
(1977) concludes that the best estimate is that a 10 percentage-point 
increase in the wage replacement rate (the ratio of the weekly benefit 
amount to the pre-UI after-tax weekly wage) raises the average unem 
ployment spell by half a week. However, this conclusion is founded on 
studies that present estimates ranging from zero to about 1.5 weeks. 
Danziger, Haveman, and Plotnick (1981) report a similarly wide range 
of estimates.
Recent research on the effect of increasing the two main parameters 
of the UI system has attempted to refine estimates of these effects by 
using new data or new methodologies. The Continuous Wage and Ben 
efit History (CWBH), which combines administrative data from sev 
eral states, has been used in many studies over the past 10 years. The 
CWBH includes accurate administrative data on levels of UI benefits, 
potential duration of benefits, and weeks of UI receipt, thereby pre 
cluding the measurement errors associated with survey data on unem 
ployment spells. 2 Recent studies also tend to use hazard models to 
control for the use of incomplete, or censored, measures of unemploy 
ment spells. A measure of unemployment is said to be "censored" if the 
unemployment spell is not completed at the point of observation. This 
happens either because observed spells are measured by UI receipt, 
which cannot account for unemployment beyond benefit exhaustion, or 
because survey data measure unemployment as of the time of the sur 
vey and cannot measure spells that continue beyond the time of the sur-
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vey. Since weeks of UI receipt are often used in recent studies, 
censoring can be a major issue because the measure itself can intro 
duce bias into the estimates—especially since substantial rates of bene 
fit exhaustion imply that a large proportion of observed unemployment 
spells are, in fact, incomplete. Hazard models allow researchers to con 
trol for the biases introduced by censored measures of unemployment 
by explicitly treating censored spells differently than completed spells 
in the estimation procedure.
The recent studies that use new data and more appropriate methods 
find that the estimated impact of increased benefit amounts on unem 
ployment spells tends to be higher than the half-week response to a 10 
percentage-point increase in the replacement rate cited by Hamermesh 
(1977). Moffitt and Nicholson (1982) estimate that a 10 percentage- 
point increase in the replacement rate extends unemployment spells by 
slightly less than one week (table 7.1). Moffitt (1985a) reports that esti 
mates based on the CWBH data imply that a 10 percent increase in the 
weekly benefit amount (which represents an increase in the average 
replacement rate of about 6 percentage points) raises unemployment 
spells by half a week. In terms of replacement rate impacts, this sug 
gests that a 10 percentage-point increase in the replacement rate would 
raise unemployment spells by about 0.8 weeks. Meyer (1990), using 
the same data as Moffitt but somewhat different estimation methods, 
finds an even greater impact. His findings suggest that a 10 percentage- 
point increase in the replacement rate lengthens unemployment spells 
by one-and-a-half weeks.
Because the evidence shows that the benefit amount significantly 
affects unemployment spells, it seems clear that disincentives to reem- 
ployment are inherent in the UI system and should not be ignored in 
setting the benefit amount. If benefits are increased because of con 
cerns about adequacy, the result will be longer unemployment spells 
for claimants. Although the exact magnitude of the response is uncer 
tain, the lengthening in average unemployment spells is likely to be in 
the range of 0.5 weeks to 1.5 weeks for every 10 percentage-point 
increase in replacement rates.
Impact of Changes in the Potential Duration of Benefits
Studies have generally shown that, as predicted, increases in the 
potential duration of benefits lengthen unemployment spells, although
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the magnitude of the impact is not clear. The recent estimates shown in 
table 7.1 suggest that a one-week rise in potential duration extends 
unemployment by between 0.1 and 0.5 weeks. This is a fairly wide 
range of estimates, which suggests, for example, that increasing poten 
tial duration from 26 weeks to 36 weeks would lengthen average 
unemployment spells by between 1 week and 5 weeks. Even estimates 
near the lower end of the range imply that the impact of an increase in 
potential duration is important. Katz and Meyer (1990) show, for 
example, that a given cut in UI expenditures achieved by reducing the 
potential duration of benefits shortens unemployment spells by twice 
as much as a similar cut achieved by reducing benefit levels. Regard 
less, policy prescriptions based on estimates of such uncertain magni 
tudes need to be evaluated with great care.
Research has also addressed the issue of the timing of reemploy- 
ment relative to the timing of benefit exhaustion. Both the labor-supply 
and job-search theories imply that the probability of reemployment 
increases near the point of benefit exhaustion. These predictions are 
confirmed by empirical research (Katz and Meyer 1990), which shows 
that the rate at which claimants secure work increases substantially just 
before they exhaust their benefits. Katz and Meyer conclude from these 
findings that the potential duration of benefits has a strong effect on 
either recall policies of firms or on job-search strategies of workers.
In a different study based on a nationally representative sample of 
UI claimants, Corson and Dynarski (1990) also detect a jump in the 
probability of reemployment near the point of benefit exhaustion, but, 
contrary to Katz and Meyer, they argue that the magnitude of the effect 
is modest. 3 They emphasize that 75 percent of workers who exhausted 
their benefits were still unemployed more than a month after receiving 
their final UI payment, and that 60 percent were still unemployed 10 
weeks after their final payment.
While the estimates from these studies apply to the UI claimant pop 
ulation as a whole, researchers have recently emphasized the impor 
tance of distinguishing between claimants who eventually return to 
their previous job and claimants who accept a new job. Data drawn 
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID, 1980-1981) for a 
sample of unemployed workers (both UI claimants and nonclaimants) 
show that 52 percent of unemployment spells in that sample ended in a 
return to the previous employer (Katz and Meyer 1990). Research has
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shown that at the time of their layoff, workers are generally able to 
accurately predict whether or not they will be recalled. Among a 
nationally representative sample of UI claimants from 1987 and 1988, 
92 percent of those who were given definite recall dates returned to 
work for their pre-UI employers. About 70 percent of claimants who 
expected to be recalled but who were not given definite recall dates 
returned to work for their pre-UI employers. In contrast, only 9 percent 
of claimants who did not expect to be recalled returned to work for 
their previous employers.
One would predict that claimants who expect to be recalled are 
likely to differ in their job-search behavior from claimants who do not 
expect to be recalled. The possibility of being recalled may prompt 
claimants to invest less time and money in the search for a new job. 
Claimants who anticipate recall may also respond differently to 
changes in UI than do other claimants. The models presented in the 
preceding section on theory may not apply to claimants who expect to 
be recalled and who have little control over the timing of their recall. 
Hence, the predicted effects of UI based on these models may apply 
best to claimants who do not anticipate being recalled.
Recent estimates tend to support this prediction. Corson and Dynar- 
ski (1990) find that, as postulated, increases in the replacement rate and 
in the potential duration of benefits lead to longer unemployment spells 
for claimants who do not expect to be recalled. However, increases in 
the replacement rate are associated with significant decreases in UI 
receipt for claimants who expect to be recalled, and variations in 
potential duration of benefits have a small and insignificant impact on 
these claimants. Corson and Dynarski attribute the reduction in UI 
spells of claimants who expect to be recalled to the layoff and recall 
policies of firms.
Impact of Unemployment Insurance on Reemployment Wages
The preceding empirical studies suggest that the availability of UI 
tends to prolong unemployment spells. Despite these findings, we can 
not determine whether the additional periods of unemployment due to 
UI represent leisure time or extra job-search time. Presumably, if UI 
gives claimants extra time to search for a job, and the search is produc 
tive, then reemployment outcomes should, on average, be more favor 
able with UI than in the absence of UI.
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One important outcome that can be, used to test this hypothesis is the 
wage at reemployment. UI may have a positive impact on reemploy- 
ment wages by inducing claimants to be more selective in their accep 
tance of wage offers. Several studies that have attempted to estimate 
the impact of UI on reemployment wages provide only mixed evidence 
that such an effect exists. In an early study of the relationship between 
UI and reemployment wages, Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) estimated 
that a 10 percentage-point rise in the wage replacement rate increased 
the reemployment wage by 7.0 percent for men and 1.5 percent for 
women. These results suggest that the growth in unemployment associ 
ated with increases in UI represents, to some extent, productive job 
search. However, subsequent studies have failed to support this finding 
(Classen 1977, 1979; Moffitt 1985b; and Meyer 1989). Most recently, 
Meyer (1989) found no evidence that increases in state minimum and 
maximum benefit levels have caused claimants to have higher reem 
ployment earnings. His point estimates imply a decline in wages in 
response to benefit increases, but the large standard errors of these esti 
mates make it impossible to say anything conclusive about the actual 
sign of the effect.
Several factors may complicate the potentially positive link between 
UI and higher reemployment wages. First, claimants may use their UI 
to search longer for jobs that have better benefits or other desirable 
characteristics, but not necessarily higher pay. Second, claimants may 
use their UI to search longer for jobs with better training opportunities 
but with relatively low pay in the short run. Both of these factors imply 
that even if claimants use UI to look for a better job, the effect on reem 
ployment wages may still be ambiguous.
Institutional Factors Affecting the Job-Search Behavior of Claimants
To counteract the reemployment disincentives inherent in UI, state 
UI systems refer claimants to the Employment Service (ES) and 
impose various work-search requirements on them. 4 Most states 
require all new claimants who are not employer-attached to register 
with the state ES. These claimants can use job placement assistance 
and other ES services, such as employment counseling. The ES may 
also refer claimants to particular jobs if their skills match the require 
ments of positions listed with the ES. In this case, state laws generally
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require individuals to accept the referral to "suitable work," or they 
may be denied benefits. However, the ES does not have the resources 
or the appropriate job listings to provide job referrals to the majority of 
claimants.
Claimants are also expected to document their work search as part 
of the UI claims process. In many states, they must provide UI with a 
minimum number of names of potential employers contacted for each 
claims week. Nevertheless, state agencies usually do not aggressively 
validate the information provided, which leads one to question the 
effectiveness of the current work-search requirements in offsetting the 
reemployment disincentive of UI. On the other hand, evidence from a 
recent demonstration of alternative work-search policies shows that 
standard work-search requirements do reduce benefit receipt as com 
pared with a system in which claimants do not have to document their 
work-search efforts (Johnson and Klepinger 1994). New legislation 
requires claimants identified as likely to exhaust UI benefits to partici 
pate in mandatory job-search assistance services, which have the 
potential to further offset the reemployment disincentive effects of UI. 
These requirements are discussed later in this chapter.
Other Effects of Unemployment Insurance
Although it seems clear that UI tends to prolong the unemployment 
spells of claimants, its impact on the unemployment rate or on the pro 
portion of the population that is employed is unclear. UI prolongs 
unemployment spells because it negatively affects the transition of UI 
claimants into jobs. While this particular consequence would tend to 
decrease employment at any given time, it could be offset by UI 
impacts on other labor market transitions. Furthermore, UI may have 
spillover effects on individuals who do not respond directly to UI but 
are nonetheless affected by the behavior of UI claimants.
Effects on Labor Market Transitions
The effects of UI may extend to labor market transitions beyond that 
from unemployment to employment, which has been the focus of most
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research on UI. Figure 7.4 shows the predicted impact of UI on transi 
tions between three different situations: employment, unemployment, 
and not being in the labor force. The effect discussed so far, the reem- 
ployment disincentive faced by benefit claimants, is represented by the 
negative sign next to the arrow from unemployment to employment. 
This shows that, given the reemployment disincentive inherent in UI, 
one would predict that UI has a negative impact on the rate at which 
workers move from unemployment to employment. However, the 
existence of UI may also affect the flow of individuals in the opposite 
direction. For example, UI may increase the transitions from employ 
ment to unemployment because the protection it offers makes jobs with 
a high risk of layoff more attractive than they would be in the absence 
of UI. If workers are more likely to take high-risk jobs, the layoff rate 
for the labor force in general should rise, expanding the flow from 
employment to unemployment. Furthermore, UI may cause firms to 
increase the use of temporary layoffs to manage their workforce, which 
would also increase the rate at which individuals move from employ 
ment to unemployment. 5
In addition to the effect on the transitions between employment and 
unemployment, UI may influence the transitions in and out of the labor 
force. First, the existence of UI should decrease the flow of people out 
of the labor force. Employed workers are less likely to leave the labor 
force directly because they can receive UI benefits by moving to unem 
ployment instead. Similarly, unemployed workers are reluctant to leave 
the labor force because such a move would entail the loss of their ben 
efits. Hence, both employed and unemployed individuals are less likely 
to leave the labor force than they would be in the absence of UI.
The existence of UI should increase the flow of individuals from 
outside the labor force into both employment and unemployment. The 
insurance value of UI increases the movement of individuals into the 
labor force because it makes work more attractive. 6 This effect tends to 
increase the flow into both employment and unemployment because 
some workers move directly into jobs while others begin searching for 
work and are therefore classified as unemployed. Hamermesh (1979) 
studied the effect of UI on flows into employment and found that, for 
married women, the estimated rise in employment because of UI was 
nearly large enough to fully compensate for the increase in unemploy 
ment due to the Ul-related reemployment disincentive.
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Not in Labor Force 
(net effect -)
Accounting for the effects of UI on all labor market transitions gen 
erates some clear hypotheses on the net effects of UI on unemployment 
and labor force participation. First, as shown in figure 7.4, UI is pre 
dicted to generate a net increase in labor force participation because it 
positively influences both of the flows into the labor force and nega 
tively influences both of the flows out of the labor force. Similarly, 
unemployment should rise because the existence of UI increases both 
of the flows into unemployment and decreases both of the flows out of 
unemployment. Only the net effect on employment is ambiguous given 
the impacts shown in figure 7.4.
Clark and Summers (1982), who have conducted the only compre 
hensive empirical study of the effects of UI on labor market transitions, 
present findings that are largely consistent with figure 7.4. They esti 
mate that UI has a positive and significant impact on the transition 
from employment to unemployment, a strong negative effect on the 
transition from employment out of the labor force, and a positive and
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significant effect on the transition to unemployment from outside the 
labor force. However, they find that UI has a negative effect on the 
transition to employment from outside the labor force, contrary to what 
is shown in figure 7.4. In addition, the estimated effects on the transi 
tions out of unemployment are small and insignificant.
Taken together, the estimated impacts of UI on all labor market tran 
sitions imply that UI increases unemployment, but that it also raises 
labor force participation and employment. Clark and Summers esti 
mate that UI, as it existed in 1978, caused a net increase in the unem 
ployment rate of 0.65 percentage points, a net increase in the 
employment ratio of 0.62 percentage points, and a net decrease in the 
labor force nonparticipation ratio of 1.11 percentage points. 7 These 
estimates are consistent with the predicted net effects shown in figure 
7.4.
These findings suggest that studies that focus solely on UI claimants 
in evaluating the incentive effects of UI may overstate the impacts of 
the program on net unemployment. However, so far, the issues 
addressed by Clark and Summers have not been examined by other 
empirical studies. More evidence is needed before we can declare that 
UI increases employment.
Effects of UI on Nonrecipients
A majority of unemployed workers do not receive UI benefits either 
because they are not eligible or because they do not choose to receive 
them. In addition, the rate of benefit receipt among the unemployed has 
declined in recent years. 8 The ratio of claims to unemployment aver 
aged 0.35 in the 1980s, compared with 0.41 in the 1970s (Corson and 
Nicholson 1988).
Recent discussions of the disincentive impacts of UI have addressed 
the possibility that the behavior of recipients has spillover effects on 
unemployed workers not receiving UI. If UI recipients and other unem 
ployed workers are competing for a limited number of job vacancies, 
the ability of the other unemployed workers, or nonrecipients, to find a 
job may be affected by the actions of the UI recipients. If UI reduces 
the job-search intensity or the rate of job acceptance among recipients, 
it may enhance the reemployment opportunities available to nonrecipi 
ents, allowing the nonrecipients to return to work faster than they
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would have in the absence of UI. This would shorten the average 
unemployment spells of nonrecipients. The size of this effect would 
depend partly on the degree to which nonrecipients are substitutable 
for recipients with regard to filling the existing job vacancies. Given 
the potential for substitutability, a full analysis of the net effect of UI 
on unemployment spells must address potential impacts on average 
spells of nonrecipients as well as of recipients.
Initial empirical evidence suggests that these spillover effects are 
important. Levine (1993) estimates that the effects are substantial: a 10 
percentage-point increase in the replacement rate shortens unemploy 
ment spells of nonrecipients by one week or more. Since the majority 
of unemployed workers are nonrecipients, a spillover effect this large 
would completely offset the increase in unemployment caused by the 
rise in UI benefits, according to the estimates discussed earlier in this 
chapter. In fact, the magnitude of the effect suggests that an increase in 
UI benefits would probably generate a decrease in aggregate unem 
ployment. Levine supports this conclusion by estimating that a 10 per 
centage-point increase in the replacement rate would lead to a 0.4 
percentage-point reduction in the unemployment rate, although the 
estimate is not statistically significant. This finding appears to contra 
dict Clark and Summers (1982), who showed that a rise in UI benefit 
amounts would increase the unemployment rate; however, they did not 
explicitly control for unemployed nonrecipients. Given that the Levine 
study represents the first direct analysis of spillover effects, further 
research will be required before we can draw firm conclusions on this 
potentially important outcome. 9
Potential Policy Responses to Reemployment Disincentives
The UI system has traditionally promoted rapid reemployment 
through work-search requirements and referrals to the ES. However, 
for many years, policy makers have discussed the possibility of chang 
ing the program in such a way as to create new financial incentives for 
reemployment or to provide additional job-search assistance or other 
employment services that would expedite claimants' return to work. 
The policy option related to financial incentives that has received the
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most attention is a reemployment bonus, a lump-sum paid to those who 
become reemployed quickly. Several social field experiments were 
conducted over the past decade to rigorously test this concept in an 
operational UI environment. 10 Two other sets of field experiments eval 
uated a more service-oriented approach to encouraging reemployment. 
The first set tested different strategies for providing employment ser 
vices, especially enhanced job-search assistance, to make claimants 
more employable or to make their job search more effective. The sec 
ond set offered services and benefits to claimants interested in starting 
their own business. While these experiments focused primarily on pro 
viding claimants more services, they also affected reemployment 
incentives. Both the bonus experiments and the enhanced services 
experiments were based on a random assignment design in which 
claimants were part of a control group that received existing services or 
were part of a treatment group that received the service package or the 
bonus offer being tested.
This section presents a discussion of the bonus and enhanced-ser- 
vices experiments and of how they affect the reemployment incentives 
faced by claimants. 11 Also included is a description of how legislation, 
based on the findings from these experiments, has changed the UI sys 
tem.
The Reemployment Bonus Experiments
Three bonus experiments were conducted between 1984 and 1989. 
They were designed to counteract the reemployment disincentives 
inherent in UI by offering a direct financial incentive for reemploy 
ment. The first experiment, the Illinois UI Claimant Bonus Experi 
ment, was conducted in 1984 by the Illinois Department of 
Employment and Security. In this experiment, eligible UI claimants 
were assigned randomly to the treatment group, which received a 
bonus offer, or to the control group, which received no offer. A bonus 
of $500 was paid to claimants in the treatment group who started work 
at a full-time job within 11 weeks of filing their initial UI claim and 
who remained employed for at least four months. The difference in 
average UI receipt between the treatment and control groups implies 
that the bonus offer reduced the average spell of UI benefit receipt by 
more than one week. Furthermore, the bonus was cost effective from
306 Work Incentives and Disincentives
the perspective of the UI system: for every dollar spent on bonuses in 
Illinois, UI benefit payments were reduced by more than two dollars 
(Spiegelman and Woodbury 1987).
The Illinois findings led the U.S. Department of Labor to sponsor 
additional field experiments to further test the hypothesis that a reem- 
ployment bonus offer could significantly shorten spells of insured 
unemployment and save the UI system money. In 1988 and 1989, two 
other experiments were conducted in Pennsylvania and Washington to 
test a variety of reemployment bonus offers. The findings from these 
experiments are similar. 12 Bonus offers in the two experiments tended 
to reduce benefit payments, but the effect was more modest than that 
found in Illinois. 13 Moreover, for nearly all of the bonus offers that 
were tested, the amount of bonus payments plus the administrative 
costs associated with making the offers exceeded the estimated savings 
in UI payments generated by the offers (Decker and O'Leary 1995). 
These results from Pennsylvania and Washington therefore contradict 
those from Illinois and suggest that reemployment bonuses are 
unlikely to be a cost-effective method for speeding reemployment, at 
least from the standpoint of the UI system. 14
Overall, the outcomes from the bonus experiments clearly demon 
strate that claimants respond to financial incentives for reemployment, 
and that a reemployment bonus can at least partly counteract the reem 
ployment disincentives in the UI system. However, the findings also 
preclude us from being optimistic about the possibility of using reem 
ployment bonuses to generate net savings for the UI system. The esti 
mated impacts are generally not large enough to generate such net 
savings.
Two other factors not reflected in the estimates of the bonus impacts 
may cast further doubt on the potential for net savings from reemploy 
ment bonuses. First, the behavior of claimants who are offered a bonus 
may have displacement effects on other UI claimants and unemployed 
workers who are not offered a bonus. Second, the availability of reem 
ployment bonuses may increase entry into UI.
If all unemployed workers generally compete for a limited number 
of job vacancies, claimants who find positions more quickly because 
they receive a bonus offer may displace other unemployed workers 
from these jobs. The increase in employment among the bonus claim 
ants may therefore be partly or fully offset by decreased employment
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among other unemployed individuals. Consequently, the impact esti 
mates cannot be used to determine the full effect of a bonus on the total 
unemployment rate because they do not account for displacement. 15
In terms of how the availability of reemployment bonuses affects 
entry into UI, unemployed workers who previously did not apply for 
UI might be induced to do so once they know they can receive a special 
payment upon reemployment. For example, individuals who expect to 
be unemployed for a few weeks might not apply for UI under normal 
circumstances. However, a reemployment bonus would make applying 
for UI considerably more valuable to them, since they are likely to 
receive that payment when they return to work. The potential for entry 
effects would add to the net costs of offering a permanent reemploy 
ment bonus, and entry effects are not accounted for in the estimated 
impacts from the bonus experiments. 16 One way to address increased 
entry would be to tie the bonus offer to an increase in the waiting 
period for filing an initial benefit claim. The longer waiting period 
would discourage the short-term unemployed from filing a claim that 
establishes potential eligibility for the reemployment bonus.
An alternative to a bonus as an incentive for reemployment would 
be a wage supplement for claimants who take a job. Wage supplements 
may encourage some claimants to accept job offers that they otherwise 
would not take, thus shortening average unemployment spells. The 
impact of such a supplement would probably vary according to its size 
and duration and how eligibility for it is defined. The displacement 
effect of changing the incentives for reemployment is an issue for a 
wage supplement as it is for reemployment bonuses. Claimants who 
take jobs more readily in response to a wage supplement may displace 
unemployed workers who are not offered a wage supplement. To date, 
there have been no experiments to test the effect of wage supplements 
on UI claimants, 17 but the findings from the bonus experiments suggest 
that the effect would probably be modest.
Enhanced Services Experiments
Two types of services for unemployed workers, job-search assis 
tance and self-employment assistance, have been tested in recent 
experiments. This section presents the results from these experiments 
and describes the UI legislation based on these findings. The discus-
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sion focuses particularly on the relationship between the tested ser 
vices and the reemployment incentives faced by UI claimants.
The Job-Search Experiments
The UI system has traditionally encouraged reemployment of claim 
ants through work-search requirements and referrals to the ES. Over 
the past 15 years, there has been a trend toward relaxing work-search 
requirements, and some states have eliminated them altogether. How 
ever, federal policy makers have recently moved toward requiring 
claimants to participate in employment services as a condition of UI 
receipt. In the final extension of the federal Emergency Unemployment 
Compensation program, 18 states are required to implement a system for 
evaluating claimants as they enter the UI system and to provide perma 
nently displaced claimants with mandatory job-search assistance or 
other employment services. The states must use a set of characteristics 
to create a "profile" of each claimant and to identify claimants who are 
unlikely to become reemployed quickly. 19 These individuals are then 
provided a set of mandatory services intended to help them prepare for 
and find a new job. The mandatory nature of these services suggests 
that, in addition to preparing claimants for a new job, they may 
increase the perceived costs of collecting UI benefits and therefore 
affect the reemployment incentives faced by claimants.
The impetus for the creation of a worker profiling and reemploy 
ment services system is a set of findings from the New Jersey Unem 
ployment Insurance Reemployment Demonstration. As with the bonus 
experiments, the New Jersey demonstration was based on a classical 
design in which claimants were assigned to the control group, which 
received existing services, or to a treatment group, which was required 
to participate in a set of job-search assistance activities. 20 The package 
of job-search assistance offered to treatment group members was 
intended to speed reemployment by encouraging claimants to search 
more aggressively and more effectively for a new job. The findings 
from this demonstration show that claimants who received mandatory 
job-search assistance returned to work more quickly than claimants 
who did not receive such help. Because claimants resumed work more 
quickly, they also claimed one-half of one week less of UI benefits 
over the year after their initial claim, and the decrease in UI payments 
generated by mandatory job-search assistance was large enough to pay
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for the provision of the services (Corson et al. 1989). Job-search assis 
tance therefore appears to be a cost-effective method for encouraging 
reemployment. Two other random-assignment studies that tested the 
effects of alternative job-search assistance policies, the Charleston 
Claimant Placement and Work Test Demonstration (Corson, Long, and 
Nicholson 1984) and the Washington Alternative Work Search Experi 
ment (Johnson and Klepinger 1994), also show that mandatory job- 
search assistance can help expedite reemployment.
Most discussions about the impacts of mandatory job-search assis 
tance focus on the magnitude of the impacts rather than on the process 
through which they occur. We can consider at least three different ways 
in which assistance can have an effect on reemployment. First, job- 
search assistance can make claimants more effective job searchers, 
resulting in quicker reemployment. I refer to this influence as the skills 
effect of mandatory job-search assistance because it occurs as claim 
ants take the skills that they learn from the job-search workshop and 
related services and apply them in looking for a new job.
Second, job-search assistance can lead to more rapid reemployment 
by encouraging claimants to begin searching for work sooner than they 
otherwise would. The help may give claimants a psychological boost 
that inspires them to begin looking for work immediately. I refer to this 
impact as the encouragement effect of mandatory job-search assis 
tance. Like the skills effect, the encouragement effect is related to the 
substance of services designed to help claimants cope with the psycho 
logical aspects of unemployment and to stimulate claimants to search 
aggressively for a new job.
Finally, mandatory job-search assistance may also affect the incen 
tives for reemployment. As is true for the financial parameters of UI, its 
nonfinancial aspects, such as administrative requirements or manda 
tory services, have important influences on reemployment incentives. 
Regarding mandatory job-search assistance, claimants may return to 
work more quickly in order to avoid participating in job-search assis 
tance services. Because this behavior is caused by the incentives cre 
ated by the services rather than by the services themselves, I refer to 
this impact as the incentive effect of mandatory job-search assistance.
Indirect evidence of the potential importance of these different 
effects of mandatory job-search assistance can be obtained by examin 
ing the impact of assistance on the rates at which claimants exit the UI
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system, focusing especially on the timing of these impacts. If the skills 
effect is dominant, and claimants exit UI because the services make 
their job search more effective, we would expect the impact on the exit 
rate to occur either after the services are received, or possibly near the 
end of services if claimants apply their new search skills immediately. 
If the encouragement effect is important, we would expect the impact 
on the exit rate to occur somewhat earlier than with the skills effect. 
This is because the encouragement effect could occur as services are 
beginning, such that claimants are inspired to immediately begin 
searching for a new job. Of course, even if claimants begin looking 
right away, it may take them some time to find a new job. Hence, the 
encouragement effect may increase the exit rate both during and after 
the services. The incentive effect would generate earlier impacts than 
would either the skills effect or the encouragement effect. Claimants 
who return to work and exit UI to avoid participating in services would 
do so after being informed of the services, possibly before such assis 
tance even begins. The incentive effect may continue as services are 
being delivered if claimants want to avoid participating in additional 
services. Thus, it is impossible to disentangle the incentive effect from 
the encouragement effect because both impacts would increase the UI 
exit rate throughout the period of service delivery.
Evidence from the UI demonstrations on the timing of exit from UI 
suggests that the encouragement and incentive effects play important 
roles in the impact of assistance on employment and on UI receipt. 
Corson and Decker (1989) show that, in the New Jersey demonstration, 
a significant part of the impact of mandatory job-search was due to an 
increased UI exit rate in the first seven weeks after the initial claim. 
The timing of this result corresponds to the periods in which claimants 
were notified about services (generally in week four after the initial 
claim) or were required to participate in services (generally weeks five 
to seven after the initial claim). 21 Johnson and Klepinger (1994) 
detected a similar effect of mandatory services in the Washington 
Alternative Work Search Experiment. This early impact implies that 
mandatory job-search assistance encouraged some claimants to return 
to work quickly, before the services were completed or, in some cases, 
even before services began.
Although the early impacts suggest that the incentive and encour 
agement effects are important, we do not know whether they account
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for most of the impact of job-search assistance or whether the skills 
effect is also key. In addition, regardless of the source of the impact of 
job-search assistance, the service had important long-run benefits. In 
an evaluation of the long-run impacts of the New Jersey demonstration, 
Corson and Haimson (1996) find that job-search assistance reduced UI 
benefit receipt not only in the initial benefit year but in subsequent 
years as well. They conclude that claimants who were assigned to man 
datory job-search assistance found employment that was more stable 
than that found by control group members.
The Self-Employment Experiments
Self-employment assistance is another policy option that expands 
the services available to UI claimants and expedites reemployment. 
Under the traditional UI system, claimants must be available for work 
and conduct an active job search. Therefore, an individual who 
"works" full-time on starting a business is generally ineligible for UI. 
This policy creates a disincentive to self-employment, but recent legis 
lation gives states the option to change this policy. Title V of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Implementation Act (P.L. 
103-182) allows states to offer self-employment assistance to help 
speed the transition of dislocated workers into new employment. Under 
this service option, eligible claimants who want to establish their own 
business are paid a self-employment allowance that is equivalent to 
their UI benefit. They are expected to work full-time on starting their 
business, and they are exempted from UI work-search requirements. In 
addition, they are allowed to retain any earnings from self-employ 
ment. In effect, the new law removes the barrier to full-time self- 
employment by allowing payments to self-employed claimants. States 
are also required to provide self-employment assistance services to 
claimants receiving self-employment allowances. 22 Participation in 
these services, which is mandatory for recipients of the allowance, is 
limited to no more than 5 percent of regular UI claimants. So far, four 
states are operating self-employment programs for their UI claimants. 23
This legislation is a response to the relatively positive findings from 
random-assignment self-employment demonstrations conducted in 
Washington and Massachusetts. The results indicate that self-employ 
ment is a viable reemployment option for a small proportion of UI 
claimants. Both demonstrations provided self-employment allowances
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and additional assistance to claimants who completed a set of initial 
intake activities. In Washington, the self-employment allowance was 
offered as a lump-sum payment equal to the amount of the claimant's 
remaining UI entitlement, while, in Massachusetts claimants were 
offered weekly allowances equal to their UI benefit amount. Of tar 
geted claimants, 4 percent in Washington and 2 percent in Massachu 
setts completed the initial intake activities and were determined to be 
eligible for participation in the program (Benus, Wood, and Grover 
1994). In terms of the impact on economic outcomes, the availability 
of self-employment assistance shortened unemployment spells among 
claimants in both demonstrations and increased earnings in one of the 
demonstrations (Washington). 24 Only in Massachusetts did the self- 
employment program reduce total benefits (regular UI payments plus 
self-employment allowances) paid during the benefit year, by about 
$700 per eligible claimant. The program in Washington, which paid 
lump-sum self-employment allowances, increased total benefits paid 
by about $1,100 per eligible claimant. Self-employment assistance 
may also decrease the probability that individuals file claims in the 
future, which would generate savings in UI benefits in the long run. At 
this time, the data to investigate this potential long-run impact on new 
claims are not available.
Conclusion
Changes in the parameters of the UI system affect unemployment as 
predicted by theory: increases in the amount and potential duration of 
benefits tend to prolong unemployment spells. These effects should 
therefore be considered in evaluating any proposals to alter UI parame 
ters. In fact, work disincentives were an important consideration in the 
move to apply the federal income tax to UI benefits beginning in 1979, 
which reduced the after-tax benefit paid to claimants. 25
Despite evidence of the presence of disincentive effects, researchers 
disagree on the importance of these effects. This dispute arises partly 
because estimates of the impacts of changing UI parameters cover a 
wide range, and partly because researchers describes similar estimates 
in different ways. Where one researcher characterizes an effect as
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"substantial," another views it as "modest." Regardless, work disincen 
tives of some magnitude are implicit in UI insofar as it pays claimants 
for staying unemployed. The task of policy makers, therefore, is to bal 
ance the need for adequate benefits with the need to limit the disincen 
tive to work.
Other potential effects of UI beyond work disincentives should also 
be considered in setting benefit parameters. Although higher benefits 
prolong unemployment, they may generate better reemployment out 
comes if the period of additional unemployment is spent finding the 
best possible job. The most obvious implication of this argument is that 
higher UI benefits should cause higher reemployment wages, but 
empirical studies of this issue have thus far provided only mixed evi 
dence that such an effect exists.
Even though UI benefits prolong unemployment spells of claimants, 
they may not necessarily lead to lower aggregate employment or to 
higher aggregate unemployment for the population. Individuals are 
probably more likely to enter the labor force and less likely to leave it 
because of the availability of UI. As the labor force expands, aggregate 
employment would tend to increase. UI benefits may also have an indi 
rect effect on those unemployed workers not receiving benefits. If all 
unemployed individuals tend to compete for a limited number of job 
vacancies, greater unemployment among claimants might be matched 
by a drop in unemployment among other jobless persons who would 
otherwise be crowded out of work opportunities by claimants. To date, 
not enough empirical research has been conducted to fully assess the 
impact of UI on all possible labor market transitions.
NOTES
I thank Ronald Oaxaca, Christopher O'Leary, Stephen Wandner, Walter Corson, Sheena 
McConnell, and Daryl Hall for their comments on earlier drafts of this chapter
1 Another reason for an increase in the probability of reemployment near the point at which 
benefits are exhausted is that firms who have temporarily laid off workers have an incentive to 
recall them while they are still receiving benefits Otherwise, some portion of those laid off will 
accept other jobs after benefits are exhausted This is expensive for the firm if the workers have 
skills or training that are specific to that firm. See chapter 8 for a discussion of the effect of UI on 
layoff and hiring incentives for firms
2. For example, Sider (1985) discusses errors in measuring unemployment spells using Cur 
rent Population Survey data.
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3 Corson and Dynarski also note that the precision of the estimates does not allow them to 
reject the hypothesis that the increase in reemployment probabilities in weeks near benefit exhaus 
tion was due to chance.
4. Chapters 4 and 11 discuss the effect of UI work-search requirements.
5. See chapter 8 for a full discussion of employer behavior under UI.
6. The insurance value of UI that makes work more attractive may be somewhat offset by UI 
taxes, depending on whether the incidence, or the true burden, of the tax falls on employees or 
employers. If the incidence falls on employees, their net wage will be reduced, which will make 
work somewhat less attractive
7. The employment ratio is the proportion of total employment to the total working-age popu 
lation The nonparticipation ratio is the proportion of working-age individuals who are neither 
employed nor unemployed to the total working-age population.
8. Corson and Nicholson (1988), Blank and Card (1991), and Vroman (1991) discuss this 
trend and its causes.
9. Davidson and Woodbury (1995) present preliminary findings, based on a simulation model 
calibrated using estimates from the UI bonus experiments (see the following section), which sug 
gest a much smaller spillover effect than that found by Levine (1993) They estimate that a 10 per 
centage-point increase in the benefit amount would shorten unemployment spells of nonrecipients 
by one-half to one day, and that a one-week increase in the potential duration would shorten spells 
by one-quarter of a day.
10 Laboratory experiments can also be used to investigate the factors that affect job search in 
a setting with UI benefits. Cox and Oaxaca (1989) discuss how laboratory experiments can test 
some of the principles that underlie the existing research on UI.
11. Meyer (1995) provides a detailed summary of many of the UI experiments discussed in 
this chapter
12. O'Leary, Spiegelman, and Kline (1995) discuss the findings from the Washington experi 
ment, and Corson et al (1992) discuss the findings from the Pennsylvania experiment.
13. A reemployment bonus was also tested as part of the New Jersey UI Reemployment Dem 
onstration. Since the design of this bonus was different from that of the bonuses offered in Illinois, 
Washington, and Pennsylvania, I exclude it from my discussion However, as is true for the results 
from Pennsylvania and Washington, the findings from the New Jersey bonus experiment suggest 
that a bonus has a smaller impact than that found in Illinois. See Decker (1994) for a detailed 
comparison of the Illinois and New Jersey findings.
14. Davidson and Woodbury (1991) argue that the relatively larger impact in the Illinois 
experiment was due to the inclusion of a subset of claimants who were eligible for an additional 
12 weeks of UI benefits through Federal Supplemental Compensation. Analysis based on claim 
ants eligible only for regular UI benefits generates impact estimates similar to those found in 
Pennsylvania and Washington. These findings suggest that the potential savings from a reemploy 
ment bonus increase when potential benefit durations are longer.
15. Corson et al. (1992) make an effort to account for displacement in their estimates of the 
impacts of the Pennsylvania Reemployment Bonus Demonstration, but the imprecision of the esti 
mated displacement effect renders the estimate essentially meaningless. Dynarski (1993) 
describes the general problem in trying to detect displacement effects in a demonstration setting 
Davidson and Woodbury (1993) present an alternative approach to investigating displacement 
effects based on a simulation model.
16 A reemployment bonus could also tend to increase entry into the labor force by making UI 
and therefore employment more valuable. This is in addition to the general effect of UI benefits on 
labor force entry discussed in the previous section of this chapter
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17. Corson and Haimson (1994) review issues related to the design of a wage supplement The 
use of wage supplements to encourage employment among low-income individuals is currently 
being tested in two demonstrations: the Canada Self-Sufficiency Project (Myanovich, Gurr, and 
Vernon, forthcoming) and the New Hope Project in Milwaukee (Kerksick 1993)
18. The relevant legislation is the Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1993 (Public 
Law 103-152), section 4 on worker profiling. U S Department of Labor (1994) provides a 
description of the system requirements.
19. Chapter 11 discusses claimant profiling
20. Mandatory activities included orientation, vocational testing, a one-week job-search work 
shop, an assessment interview, and follow-up contacts
21. The primary service, the job-search workshop, generally occurred in week six or seven 
after the initial claim, depending on the individual.
22. The self-employment activities that must be offered include entrepreneurial training, busi 
ness counseling, and technical assistance.
23. The four states operating UI self-employment programs are New York, Maine, Oregon, 
and Delaware.
24. These measures include combined employment and earnings from either wage and salary 
employment or self-employment.
25. In 1979, UI benefits were made taxable for single individuals whose income exceeded 
$20,000 and for married taxpayers filing jointly whose incomes exceeded $25,000 Further legis 
lation in 1982 lowered these income limits to $12,000 and $18,000, respectively. The Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 made all UI benefits taxable
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